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1 Introduction 
 
In the Maltese Energy Policy, 
 
“…nuclear power generation is not considered a 
feasible option.” 
 
-A proposal for an energy policy for Malta 2009 
 
 Presumably the rationale for the above statement 
is twofold. Firstly, financial , such a presumption is 
solidly rooted in the reality that the limited amount 
of nuclear generating station’s that have come 
online in the past twenty or so years , in the west at 
least, have done so at enormous cost. Secondly the 
perceived risk associated with a nuclear generating 
station is large, both form a safety and investment 
point of view. These factors are inescapably 
intertwined. 
 This writing off of nuclear power for Malta, 
though seemingly reasonable, is entirely premature. 
It is certainly true that Malta is a small island and 
nuclear power generation is generally considered an 
expensive niche technology, but this perception is 
largely due to extraneous considerations with very 
little foundation and certainly not due to the 
limitations of current nuclear technology. Indeed, 
even in regard to legacy systems only a small 
number of, mostly Soviet built systems, are / were 
of any real concern. As such this paper will briefly 
examine what would constitute the ideal design of 
radiological protection measures which would allow 
for the protection of the public as well as create a 
situation where private capital, as well as the 
general public, could potentially derive a benefit 
from the construction and operation of a nuclear 
power and desalination facility. 
 
 
 
 
2 MANAGING RISK: RADIATION 
 
 It is the opinion of this paper that, one single, 
often misunderstood word, radiation, is the primary 
root cause of nuclear public perception and by 
extension, economic issues. 
 The logical course to follow is to ask what 
exactly radiation is as it applies to nuclear power 
generation. 
 
“Radiation; Physics 
The emission of energy as electromagnetic waves 
or as moving subatomic particles, especially high-
energy particles which cause ionization.” 
-google definition 
 
 In relation to health effects the correct handling 
and limiting exposure to substances emitting 
ionizing radiation is a must, other less high energy 
emitters should also be treated with care but are not 
as challenging [T. Henriksen et al, 2013]. However 
this is not to say such substances are inherently 
dangerous, far from it, they possess properties that 
are immensely useful to health care, industry and 
agriculture [IAEA, 2014]. It is the manner and 
magnitude of exposure that under certain 
circumstances can cause harm [T. Henriksen et al, 
2013].     
 How this relates to nuclear safety is largely 
dependent on what sort of model one refers to in 
relation to approximating the harm potential of 
material that has been released. 
 The most common and possibly inappropriate 
model, when applied to public health and radiation, 
is what is “called linear no threshold” or LNT. It is 
a model which presumes harm occurs from the very 
slightest exposure to radiation and that 
consequently there is no safe dose of radiation, this 
model is well intentioned, erring towards what is 
presumed to be an abundance of caution. The 
reasons to question the validity of applying the LNT 
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model in relation to radiological protection are 
twofold. 
 Firstly the LNT approach does not explicitly 
take into account wide variations in natural 
background radiation, for example, 0.2 mSv per 
year in Honolulu to 0.7 mSv per year in Colorado 
Springs [HPS, 2010]. Secondly when applied to 
radiation protection, the LNT model may be 
inappropriate due to a process known as hormesis 
[M. Cuttler, 2014] [T. Henriksen, 2013]. Hormesis 
is the process by which an organism responds 
positively to a small amount of a stressor , in this 
context a small dose of radiation , this exposure 
may stimulates a repair response which has, on 
balance a positive effect [ M. Cuttler , 2014 ] [ T. 
Henriksen , 2013 ] 
 The necessity of having a properly understood 
model for roughly estimating potential health 
effects cannot be over stated, this is regardless of 
whether nuclear generation is pursued. 
 With the focus of this paper being Malta, it 
would appear necessary to place particular 
emphasis on examining material relating to 
populations and areas proximal to an uncontrolled 
release of radiation and radioactive material. This 
emphasis is undertaken due to the small size of the 
Maltese islands and though not a perfect approach, 
could be of some benefit in assessing the localized 
risk brought about by the occurrence of such a 
mishap in Malta. 
 To roughly achieve this, a brief look at the after 
effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings will 
be taken. Though not strictly an uncontrolled 
release, as both cities were bombed and bombs by 
their very nature, are explicitly designed to go bang. 
 That said the radiation exposure, albeit mostly 
radiation rather than deposited radioactive material, 
and general destruction endured by the populations 
of both cities was far in excess of any credible 
civilian nuclear power plant accident. Thus 
providing a reasonable point of departure to reality 
check any concerns regarding the effects of a 
serious civilian accident. 
 In regard to the Life Span Study (LSS) 
undertaken on the survivors of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, there were definitely negative 
consequences endured by individuals unfortunate 
enough to have been exposed to high levels of 
radiation. However these negative consequences, 
though individually tragic, are, when viewed in a 
wider sense, manageable. Certainly when viewed 
against the expected outcomes for activities as 
mundane as improperly managed diabetes or a 
sedentary lifestyle. As an illustration of this in 2003 
the last full year of the lifelong studies and almost 
sixty years after exposure, 80% of those who were 
under 20 at the time of exposure were still alive as 
were 42% of the total study cohort [K. Ozasa, et al 
2012].  
 Through to the year 2000, i.e. over the course of 
55 years, 94 excess deaths due to leukaemia were 
estimated to have occurred. In regard to solid 
cancers 848 instances above what would normally 
be expected were estimated to have occurred (solid 
cancers being significantly more treatable than 
leukaemia). Both figures relate to the cohort of 
44,635 LSS survivors [RERF 2015]. It also is quite 
necessary to point out that both Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki are currently thriving cities and were not 
abandoned or rendered uninhabitable. The lesson to 
be learnt is that the consequences of a release of 
radiation are manageable. 
 This pattern is further demonstrated in the 
continuing effects of the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant accident – the largest radioactive release from 
a civilian nuclear accident on record [IAEA 2005]. 
 This extensive release was due to a convergence 
of factors, the two most serious of which were the 
reactor having a positive void coefficient and it 
lacking an effective containment vessel. A 
containment vessel is more or less self-explanatory, 
comprehending what a positive void coefficient is 
sounds intimidating but in reality is quite simple; In 
essence when a void , or relative void forms , say 
water turning to steam , the rate of reaction speeds 
up , resulting in a difficult to control situation. This 
is the exact opposite to most western designs, which 
use water as a moderator, if the water turns to steam 
the reaction stops, this is in contrast to the RBMK 
reactor used in Chernobyl which used graphite as a 
moderator. Thanks to these attributes it would not 
be unfair to categorize the RBKM as a reactor not 
even a mother could love and only the soviets 
would build. 
 However despite the reactor failing and the large 
radiation release the physical health effects have 
been quite arguably largely manageable. With 28 
attributable fatalities to radiation in 1986 and a 
roughly estimated figure of  possibly 4% of the 
predicted 100000 lifetime cancer deaths among the 
600000 or so individuals who received more 
significant exposure as a result of the accident 
[IAEA 2005].  This is in contrast to the mental 
health and social issues experienced by the affected 
populations , indeed it is the social issues 
experienced , particularly by the evacuees, which 
according to the IAEA report on the Health, 
Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts of 
Chernobyl is arguably the most serious legacy of 
the accident [IAEA 2005] .   
 From here it would seem appropriate to look 
briefly at the accident that occurred at the 
Fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant. It is worth 
mentioning that accident is being used in a more 
loose sense than in relation to, Chernobyl, as the 
plant in question was stuck by the most powerful 
tsunami and earthquake ever recorded to hit Japan [ 
USGS , 2011 ] which killed almost 16000 people [ 
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National Police Agency of Japan , 2015 ] . As a 
result of the tsunami the Fukushima daiichi nuclear 
power plants ability to deal with decay heat from 
three shutdown reactors was compromised, 
resulting in their failure. However unlike in 
Chernobyl, the reactors in Fukushima daiichi were 
of a western design and were also encased in 
containment vessels which resulted in vastly less 
radioactive release, one fifth to one tenth that of 
Chernobyl, of which a large portion blew out to sea 
[UNSCEAR 2013].  
 However there is where the differences end’s. 
Much like what occurred in Chernobyl, a mass 
evacuation was enforced by the Japanese’s 
authorities of individuals who were previously 
resident within a 20km radius of the plant. The 
maintenance in force of large parts of this 
evacuation zone, despite the greatly reduced 
radiation levels, due to half-life decay, of the most 
radioactive substances, coupled with the relatively 
manageable levels of contamination remaining, is 
unfortunately resulting in a repeat of what occurred 
in Chernobyl, that is a hysterical fear of radiation 
resulting in very real human suffering in the form 
of, mental health issues, social isolation and the 
stigma of being an evacuee. 
 Further to this Report of the United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation Sixtieth session predicts that there will be 
no radiation attributable fatalities from the 
Fukushima daiichi accident [UNSCEAR 2013] The 
lesson to be learnt, is that a possible overreaction, 
even if done for what is thought to be the right 
reason can have serious consequences for the 
individuals affected. These lessons should inform 
those making decisions with regard to acceptable 
levels of radiation exposure, it would seem that a 
departure from LNT and towards a level that is as 
high as reasonably allowable would appear to be the 
best course of action. 
 
 
3 REWARD 
 
 With the risk, or potential for risk associated 
with nuclear very briefly addressed. It would seem 
appropriate to briefly address the reward inherent in 
choosing the nuclear option.  The primary reward 
gained if nuclear is done well is financial; low cost 
energy and predictable future costs. This by its very 
nature is a reward with wide societal benefits. 
Particularly in terms of keeping a lid on the cost of 
living and allowing a degree of industrial 
competitiveness through reasonable and predictable 
energy costs. Further to this keeping energy costs 
relatively low is likely to prove very necessary to 
facilitate the increase in automation that will be 
necessary to increase productivity with a shrinking 
workforce due to demographic changes. 
 This financial reward is achievable only if risk is 
appropriately addressed, intrinsic to this is the 
recognition that it is always possible to make any 
system safer. The key is to reach a point where an 
acceptable level of safety is reached with the overall 
cost remaining competitive. Fundamental to 
achieving this on a small scale, with limited 
resources, which essentially would be the challenge 
in the Maltese setting, is the selecting of a safe and 
proven reactor design to be built in a safe but cost 
effective manner. 
 In regard to selecting an inherently safe reactor 
design, a largely pre-manufactured, or indeed fully 
modular reactor would be the ideal choice. 
However seen as there are currently no turnkey or 
modular reactors on the market, or unlikely until the 
mid-2020’s at the earliest [IAEA 2014]. An 
alternative approach may have to be pursued. Such 
an approach need not be novel; for example it is the 
opinion of this paper that a facility consisting of 
four small reactors of a little over 60MWe each 
would constitute a facility that could feasibly be 
handled by the Maltese grid. 
 As to the individual reactors , it would appear 
feasible to construct each unit as an exact replica of 
the final iteration of the Shipping port light water 
reactor as configured to accept the light water 
breeder reactor core [ LWBR ] . The LWBR was 
extensively run and proved to be an exceptionally 
efficient and long lasting configuration [DOE 
1986], which would be ideal for a plant whose 
purpose is to provide energy as cheaply and cleanly 
as possible  
 This approach, in common with the logic behind 
the use of a Modular or semi modular reactor, 
would essentially eliminate research and 
development as a significant cost, allowing the sole 
focus of the project, to be finding efficiencies in the 
construction and procurement effort. 
 Of quite some importance in providing 
breathing room for the finding of efficiencies, in a 
project as suggested above, would be ensuring 
realistic specifications and realistic supervision in 
the application of quality control. To achieve this 
adopting, as far as practicable, a standard 
reasonably familiar to industry, such as aviation 
grade, may result in more companies being willing 
to bid for and complete work to the required 
standard for a lower overall cost. 
 
 
4 FUNDING AND LIABILITY 
 
 The ideal design of radiological protection 
legislation, much like any piece of legislation, needs 
a certain element of being a two way street. In this 
regard attracting investment to fund such a project 
would require a balance be found, to ensure a 
degree of flexibility, expedience and legal certainty. 
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In order for a project to be completed with 
minimum cost to the state and by extension the 
taxpayer, it would seem logical for conditions to be 
created where by private sector investment can be 
enticed in. For a large infrastructure project like a 
nuclear power and desalination plant the primary 
concern would be enabling the plant to be built and 
operated on budget, and on time without undue 
legal or administrative uncertainty. The primary 
reason for explicitly mentioning legal and 
administrative uncertainty would be the situation 
that befell the operation of the Shoreham Nuclear 
Power Plant in New Jersey, where a completed 
plant was unable to begin production due to 
political difficulties with administrative issues [D.P. 
McCaffrey, 1991]. In current reactor licensing in 
the US, permission to construct and operate a 
reactor is granted together, in the form of a 
Combined construction and operation licence, a 
nuclear regulatory commission 10 CFR 52.103(g) , 
this model avoids many of the issues encountered in 
Shoreham and may prove useful as a reference in 
drafting a similar procedure. 
 In regard to realistic liability in the case of an 
accident it would seem, given the experience of the 
unfortunate but limited consequences of an 
uncontrolled release of radiation. It would appear 
appropriate to stipulate, in legislation, the 
circumstances and extent of compensation payable 
in the event of release of radioactive material. Such 
compensation should be in line with that normally 
payable under tort and be explicitly limited to the 
carrying out of remedial works. Such an approach 
would lead well away from the slippery slope of 
claimed real estate value losses. 
 In addition to this , given the significant 
investment involved and vulnerability of such an 
investment to persistent legal and media 
harassment, as illustrated by the recent campaigns 
for the early closure of some units in the united 
states , particularly Vermont Yankee [ M Angwin , 
2014 ] .  It would seem necessary to stipulate some 
additional legal procedural protections, particularly 
in relation to the balance of probability in civil 
matters. In this regard the standard of proof for 
bringing an action and for the finding of fault 
against an entity directly involved in the safe 
operation of a nuclear facility should be set at a 
standard of beyond all reasonable doubt. In addition 
to this the standard of proof needed to mount a 
successful defence by the entity involved should be 
to the standard of the balance of probability. The 
same approach should also be explicitly provided 
for in instances of defamation. This is much the 
same benefit provided to the most vulnerable 
individuals in the justice system, those accused of a 
criminal offence. The application of similar 
protections to the benefit of a vulnerable facility of 
national importance would, in the opinion of this 
paper be warranted. 
 Such additional protections may seem stacked in 
favour of the entity involved, but this stacking is 
justifiable given the extensive history of 
interference, through legal systems or otherwise by 
third parties intent on creating a situation where 
generating power from nuclear fission is rendered 
all but impossible [D.P. McCaffrey, 1991]. 
 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
 Nuclear power is a technology with enormous 
potential and significantly less risk than its portrayal 
in the media would suggest. With appropriate 
legislation, good planning and careful execution this 
potential to provide large amounts of very 
affordable energy and water could be realized.  
 The course of action outlined above may 
provide a useful starting point in building a 
framework which could hopefully succeed in 
creating a situation where private capital could be 
recruited in the endeavour to construct and operate 
a facility which would result in a significant 
economic and environmental benefit to Malta. 
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